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Abstract
It is frequently believed, and empirically observed, that the outcome
of an election determines government action to at least some extent. However,
the standard two-party spatial model of political competition trivializes any
post-electoral policy-making process by assuming that the party that obtains
more than fifty percent of the vote adopts the policy announced during the
electoral campaign. Its best known implication is that, under an environment
of perfect information, both candidates announce the same policy, which
coincides with the policy preferred by the median voter.
In this paper, we enrich the theoretical framework of party competition
to allow for a non-trivial policy-setting process and for sophisticated voters
who care not only about the policy implemented but also about the platform
they support with their vote. First, we show that platform convergence is a
non-robust feature created by the winner-takes-all assumption. The lightest
influence of the opposition in the policy-making process provokes a divergent
tendency in platform writing. Without abstention, an equilibrium is
characterized by polarized platforms and a moderate implemented policy that
consistently differs from the median voter ideal policy. When abstention is
introduced into the analysis, parties announce differentiated yet non-extre-
me policies, voters concentrate around the platforms, and substantial turnout
rates are generically obtained where abstention occurs among voters with
extreme views as well as with moderate views.
Key bords: Political competition, compromise, platforms, abstention.
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"It was not the kind of speech Mr. Bush
would have delivered had he won the large
victory his aides were predicting on elec-
tion night. He offered nothing to the con-
servative wing of his party, and evoked
none of the cultural issues that often divide
the two parties".
The New York Times. December 14, 2000
1. INTRODUCTION
It is frequently believed that the outcome of an election determines
government action to at least some extent1. Many empirical studies support
this view. Papers like Budge and Hofferbert (1990, 1992), Hofferbert and
Klingemann (1990), Klingemann et al. (1994), and King et al. (1993) analyze the
relationship between party platforms and policies. They find that, while
platforms and governmental outcomes consistently differ, there exist strong
links between them. A second group of studies (Poole and Rosenthal, 1984b;
Fiorina, 1974; Poole and Rosenthal, 1984a; Poole and Daniels, 1985; Poole and
Rosenthal, 1991, 1997; Snyder, 1996; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995) compare the
perceived location of platforms and implemented policies, and conclude that
while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist2.
But the standard two-party spatial model of political competition
does not differentiate between platforms and policies. It assumes that the
party that obtains more than fifty percent of the vote adopts the policy
announced during the electoral campaign. As a consequence, any post-elec-
toral policy-making process becomes a triviality.
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On theoretical grounds, this assumption has been rejected by several
authors as an unrealistic way to model the outcome of the political competition
in many modern democratic societies (Ortuño-Ortín, 1997; Gerber and Ortuño-
Ortín, 1998; Dixit et al., 2000; Alesina and Rosenthal, 1995, 1996; Austen-Smith
and Banks, 1998; Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Ortuño-Ortín argues that a
democratic society is integrated by different institutions and groups. Some of
them will favor the policies announced by the winning party, some will favor
the opposition’s platforms, but all may have some influence on the actions
taken by the government, and their influence will be a non-decreasing function
of the support received by the corresponding party: "Clearly a party winning
51% of the votes will have more difficult to carry out its proposal than one
winning 80% of the votes" (Ortuño-Ortín, 1997, p. 428). Dixit, Grossman and
Gul (2000) obtain tacit collusion in a plurality political environment. They
show that the ruling party will go to some extent towards the interests of the
opposition expecting the same treatment when it itself becomes the opposition
party. Of course, the party in power must know that its term will reach an end
and must expect the other party to gain power sometime in the future.
In this paper we follow this view and, in the spirit of the empirical
results, let the implemented policy differ to some extent from the electoral
platform of the winning party. In particular, we let the implemented policy
depend on the electoral outcome and on the platforms announced by each
party, in such a way that the higher the fraction of votes obtained by a party,
the closer the implemented policy is to its proposal. This post-electoral
policymaking process is what we call political compromise.
Modifying the policy-setting process has important implications on
voting behavior often overlooked by the literature on political compromise.
In the winner-takes-all case, when the implemented policy is the platform
announced by the winner, voting for the preferred candidate is always a
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dominant strategy for all voters. The intuition is simple. Suppose that an agent
prefers the policy proposed by party L to the policy proposed by party R. By
voting, either he does not change the outcome or he increases the probability
of winning for that party. Thus, he will always vote for his favorite platform.
However, when electoral platforms and implemented policies may differ,
voting for the preferred platform is not necessarily a dominant strategy.
Consider, for instance, a voter with moderate views. She finds the proposal of
the left party more appealing than the one from the right party. However, she
expects that, due to an overwhelming support for the left party, the
implemented policy will be "too left" for her. Then, she may decide to vote for
the right party. That is, a voter who expects party L to win and who prefers the
alternative offered by L to the one announced by party R may, nevertheless,
vote for R to "moderate" L’s policy.
On different grounds, when platforms and policies do not necessarily
coincide, voters will base their decision not only on the implications over
final policies, but also on the platforms announced by the parties. For example,
many people would feel reluctant to vote for a nazi party regardless the impact
that a larger support for that nazi party would have on the implemented
policy. Their reluctance comes from the platform represented by such a party
and not from the influence over the policy. If the nazi party were the only
alternative to obtain a more conservative policy, we may expect many of those
voters to abstain.
Therefore, we distinguish two components in voting behavior. On
the one hand, insofar as voters care about the policy outcome, they will choose
to vote for one party or the other based on the effect that a larger support for
each party have over the implemented policy. We refer to this component as
the pragmatic component of preferences. On the other hand, citizens also
consider the platform they support with their vote when deciding for whom
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to vote. Because platforms and policies do not necessarily coincide, voters
who would support a party from a purely pragmatic point of view may
decide not to do it because they strongly disagree with the party’s platform.
This is the ideological component of preferences. The final voting decision will
depend then on both the pragmatic and the ideological components of
preferences.
We study an unidimensional political game with a dynamic struc-
ture. At period one, parties announce their campaign platforms. At period
two, citizens observe the platforms and decide whether to vote for one of the
two candidates, or to abstain. Their decisions are based on their preferences
and their expectations about the outcome of the election. Finally, after the
election, a policy-setting process takes place from which a policy arises as a
function of both the platforms of each party and their electoral support.
Our first result shows that platform convergence is a non-robust
feature created by the winner-takes-all assumption. The lightest influence of
the opposition in the policy making process provokes a divergent tendency
in platform writing. Second, we find that, under reasonable assumptions, an
equilibrium always exists. Without abstention, an equilibrium is characterized
by polarized platforms and a moderate implemented policy that consistently
differs from the median voter ideal policy. When abstention is incorporated
into the analysis, parties announce differentiated, non-extreme policies, voters
concentrate around the platforms, and abstention occurs among voters with
extreme views as well as with moderate views.
The reader is encouraged to look at Figure 4 where we show two
typical examples of political equilibrium.
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2. THE MODEL
The electoral arena is assumed to be represented by an unidimensional
policy space
We model the electoral process as a political game between parties and
voters with a dynamic structure. Two parties, L and R, announce their cam-
paign platform by choosing a location on the policy space. Citizens observe
the platforms and vote for one of the two candidates, or abstain. Finally, after
the election, a policy formation process takes place during which both parties
play a role in shaping the implemented policy: one as the governing party,
the other as the opposition.
The following sections describe the three steps in the political game:
platform announcement, voting, and policy formation. Following the stan-
dard backward induction methodology, we start from the last stage, and then
work backward to describe the behavior of the players before.
2.1 Policy Formation
A key feature of the present model is that the implemented policy
may differ from the electoral platform of the winner. Policy is the result of a
post-electoral process where both parties play a role (relative to their electoral
support). For the purpose of this paper, it is convenient to model this post-
election process in its reduced form by directly specifying a map from platforms
and electoral outcomes to final policies.
T = [t , t ] Ì Ñ. Let T 2 = T ´ T. 
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A datum of the model is a weight function, g : [0,1] à [0,1]. If n is the
fraction of active voters that vote for L, then g(n) captures the weight of party
L’s proposal in the implemented policy.
Assumption 1 (A1) a)
b)
c)
Parts (b) and (c) are very natural assumptions. (b) says that if one of the
parties obtains all the votes, its platform is then adopted. By (c), the larger the
fraction of the vote a party receives, the stronger its influence in the determi-
nation of the policy. Finally, (a) introduces continuity: small perturbations in
the electoral outcome cannot produce big changes in the implemented policy.
We assume that the relevant properties of the outcome mapping are
captured by an implemented policy function, which associates to each electo-
ral result a final policy outcome. Formally3:
Definition 2.1  Define the implemented policy function
The implemented policy function     is general enough to represent a wide
variety of scenarios. For instance, although the continuity of g rules out a
winner-takes-all structure, it is easy to find a function g that satisfies A1 and for
which the implemented policy is almost discontinuous at n = ½ (see Figure
1(a)). In that example, the winner party would adopt a policy arbitrarily close
to its electoral platform if it obtained a plurality larger than just
As a further support of our claim that           is very general, Figure 1(b)
represents a function that is asymmetric but yet it satisfies A1. That is,      may
g Î C 1; 
g(0) = 0, g(1) = 1; 
g’(n) > 0, " n Î (0,1). 
tˆ : T 2 ´ [ ]1,0  à T as 
tˆ (tL,tR,n) = g(n) tL + (1-g(n)) tR (2.1) 
tˆ   
tˆ
 tˆ  
+
2
1
e. 
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very well represent a case where one of the parties is more inclined to compromise
than the other one.
Figure 1
The Weight-of-Votes Function. The function g assigns to the share of votes received by a
party the weight of that party in shaping the policy. Assumption 1 allows for almost
discontinuous functions (a) and non-symmetric functions (b).
2.2 Voting
In this section we describe the actual electoral process: we model
voting behavior and define the set of possible electoral outcomes.
Consider a continuum of citizens distributed according to their ideal
policy. Let                               describe the distribution of citizens, and let m be the
probability  measure  associated  to  T4.  That  is,  for  any Borel  subset  B of T,
m (B) = òB d F (t) represents the measure of citizens with ideal policies in B.
2.2.1 The Pragmatic Component and the Ideological Component of Preferences
Citizens observe the platforms announced by the parties, tL and tR in
T, and anticipate the policy-making process (i.e. they know the implemented
F:Ñ®[0,1] 
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policy function        and they have expectations regarding the support that each
party will receive). With this information in mind, each citizen has to decide
between voting for L, voting for R, or abstaining. Let S = {L, R, A} be the set of
actions for a particular citizen, with typical element s: s = L and s = R denote
that the citizen votes for party L and party R, respectively; s = A when the
citizen abstains.
A citizen takes tL, tR, and n as given. We postulate that she chooses an
action s ÎS in order to maximizes her preferences, represented by an utility
function                                               We interpret v(s; tL, tR, n, t) as the utility of a
citizen with ideal policy t who chooses s when the platforms are tL and tR, and
she expects a fraction n of the electorate to support L.
As explained in the Introduction, a citizen has two concerns when
casting her vote: the impact on the policy and the platform that she is supporting
with her vote. In fact, the utility function v will be defined as the sum of two
components, one for each of the two concerns.
The first component is derived as follows. Insofar voters care about
the policy outcome, they will choose to vote for one party or the other based
on the effect that a larger support for that party has on the implemented
policy5. We refer to this component as pragmatic voting. Thus, purely pragmatic
voting must be derived from the preferences of the voter over policies6. Let
preferences over policies   be  represented  by  the  single-peaked  utility  u: T
´ T à Ñ,  where  u (t; t) represents the utility that a citizen t obtains when t is
implemented. Let t = arg max { u (t; t): t Î T}, i.e. t represents the ideal policy
of citizen t. Because the policy is a function of the electoral platforms and the
allocation of votes, it is convenient to define the reduced form of the utility
over implemented policies as
tˆ  
v:S´T2´[0,1]´tà Ñ.
uˆ ( )tn;,t,t RL  = u ( )( )tn ;,t,ttˆ RL  (2.2) 
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Thus, citizen t’s pragmatic or indirect-effect component of voting for L
is the utility change implied by a larger support for party L. More precisely,
for each pair of policies (tL, tR) and given the expected electoral outcome n, t’s
pragmatic utility of voting for L will be the partial derivative of t’s utility over
policies with  respect  to  a  change  in  the  fraction  of  the  vote  received  by
party L 7. Observe that, because the fraction of voters for R is one minus the
fraction of voters for L, an increase in the support for R is equivalent to an
equal decrease in the support for L. Finally, if a citizen abstains, we set the
utility equal to  zero.   Consequently,   we   define   the  pragmatic  component
of  voting,  w: S ´  T2 ´  [0,1] ´  T à Ñ, as8
The second component of voting reflects the concern of a voter with
the platform she supports with her vote, beyond the impact on the
implemented policy. Let                                            be the non-pragmatic or ideological
component of  voting,  such  that                                                  represents the utility
of agent t from voting for the platform tL, and, similarly,                                          .
is the utility of voting for platform tR. Observe that non-pragmatic utility
depends only on the platform supported by the vote, and not on the
implemented policy. In particular, it does not involve any expectations about
what the rest of the electorate will choose to do. We normalize the ideological
utility of abstention to zero. Then,
( )
( )
( )
ï
ï
ï
î
ïï
ï
í
ì
=
=
n¶
tn¶
-
=
n¶
tn¶
=tn
Asif0
Rsif
;,t,tuˆ
Lsif
;,t,tuˆ
,,t,t;sw RL
RL
RL  (2.3) 
hˆ :S´T2´TàÑ
hˆ (L; tL, tR, t) º h(tL;t)
hˆ (R; tL, tR, t) º h(tR; t)  
hˆ (s; tL, tR, t) = 
( )
( )
ï
î
ï
í
ì
=
=th
=th
Asif0
Rsif;t
Lsif;t
R
L
 (2.4) 
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Finally, let the pragmatic and the non-pragmatic components of
voting enter additively into the utility function:
2.2.2 Consistent Vote
Given (tL, tR, n), we partition the electorate into those citizens who
vote for L, those who vote for R, and those who abstain according to
L(tL, tR, n) = { t Î T : v(L; tL, tR, n, t) ³ max {0, v(R; tL, tR, n, t) }},
R(tL, tR, n) = { t Î T : v(R; tL, tR, n, t) > max {0, v(L; tL, tR, n, t) }},
A(tL, tR, n) = { t Î T : max {v(L; tL, tR, n, t), v(R; tL, tR, n, t) } < 0}.
Then, a fraction VL(tL, tR, n) = m(L(tL, tR, n)) of the citizenry votes for L,
while party R receives VR(tL, tR, n) = m(R(tL, tR, n)). Finally, a fraction m(A(tL, tR,
n)) of the citizenry abstains.
We have described how citizens vote (or abstain) as a function of the
electoral platforms and the expected support for each party. However, our
goal is to find a correspondence that assigns to each pair of platforms the set of
all consistent or rational-expectations electoral outcomes.
Definition 2.2  We say that n is a consistent vote for the pair of policies tL, tR in T if
that is, if the allocation of votes implied when n is expected gives rise to a fraction of
votes for L equal to n.
v(s; tL, tR, n, t) = w(s; tL, tR, n, t) + hˆ (s; tL, tR, t). (2.5) 
 n+n
 n
) , t,(t V) , t,(t V
) , t,(t V
RLRRLL
RLL = v, (2.6) 
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Thus, we can define the electoral outcome correspondence
as,
c(tL, tR) = {n Î [0,1] : n is a consistent vote for (tL, tR)}.
Perhaps abusing language, and without further specifications, this
definition admits the possibility that c(tL, tR) = Æ for some tL and tR. However,
in what follows, we will restrict the analysis to environments where c(tL, tR) ¹
Æ, "(tL, tR).
2.3 Political Equilibrium
Parties are the actual players of the political game. There are two
parties that run for election, and have single-peaked preferences over policies
represented by the utility function pJ : T à Ñ, J = L, R. Let tJ = arg max {pJ(t)
: t Î T} be the ideal policy of party J 9. Assume, without loss of generality, that
tL < tR.
It is convenient to write the utility of a party as a function of the
platforms and the vote allocation by using the definition of the implemented
policy function. Define                                   as
For illustrative purposes, assume that there exists a unique consistent
electoral outcome for each pair of policies, that is, c is a function. Then we can
write                                                              and a political equilibrium is simply a
Nash equilibrium of the two-party game where parties choose platforms in T
to maximize their payoffs             In general, however, c may not be single-valued
and non-empty for all pair of policies. Therefore we introduce the following
more general definition of a political equilibrium:
c: T2 àà [ ]1,02
Jpˆ :T
2´[0,1]à Ñ  
Jpˆ (tL, tR, n) = pJ(tˆ (tL, tR, n)). 
J
~p (tL, tR) = Jpˆ (tL, tR, c(tL, tR)) 
J
~p .
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Definition 2.3  We say that (tL, tR,          is a political equilibrium if
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
3. EXAMPLE
We anticipate the main results with an illustrative example, before
presenting their formal proofs.
Consider a political process where two ideological parties, L and R,
compete over a single issue, a tax rate, for example. Let T=[0,1] represent the
policy space. The weight-of-votes function takes the following form (see
Figure 2):
Observe that, because g is concave for n > ½ and convex for n < ½,
winning the election makes a difference: the weight of the platform of the
winner party in the policy-setting process is more than proportional to the
share of votes received by that party.
Figure 2
Weight of Votes Function
n )
n Î c(tL,tR)) 
Lpˆ (tL, tR,n ) ³ Lpˆ (t, tR,n) "t Î T and "n Î c(t,tR), and  
Rpˆ (tL, tR,n ) ³ Rpˆ (tL,t,n) "t Î T and "n Î c(tL,t). 
2
)(cos1
)(g
np-
=n  (3.1)
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Voters care about the implemented policy (the tax rate). Let the
preferences of voters over tax rates be represented by the following Euclidean
utility function:
Then, the pragmatic component of voting is given by (see(2.3)).
On the other hand, voters also care about the platform they are
supporting with their vote. Let the ideological component of voting represent
the dis-utility of supporting a platform far from one’s ideal policy. In particu-
lar, we take ideological voting to be a linear function of the distance between
the "ideology" of the voter and the platform of the party:
h(t; p) = - 2 | t - p |.
Finally, if a citizen abstains, her utility of voting is zero, since both the
pragmatic component and the ideological component are zero.
In summary, the utility of voting (the sum of the pragmatic and the
ideological components of voting) of a citizen t is
Let the electorate be distributed according to a triangular distribu-
tion with mode m (see Figure 3 for a few members of this family of density
functions).
u(t; t) = -
2
1
(t - t)2 (3.2) 
w(L; tL, tR, n, t) = (tˆ (tL, tR, n) - t) g’(n) (tR - tL) 
w(R; tL, tR, n, t) = (t - tˆ (tL, tR, n)) g’(n) (tR - tL) 
v(L; tL, tR, n, t) = (tˆ (tL, tR, n) - t) g’(n) (tR - tL) - 2 | t - p |  
v(R; tL, tR, n, t) = (t - tˆ (tL, tR, n)) g’(n) (tR - tL) - 2 | t - p | 
v(A; tL, tR, n, t) = 0 
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Figure 3
Family of Triangular Density Functions
Finally, parties also have Euclidean preferences represented by
We take the ideal policy of the left party to be tL= 0.3, while the right
party’s ideal policy is tR= 0.8.
After several manipulations, it is easy to show that, given (tL, tR, n),
active voting occurs on two intervals around the electoral platforms: [l1, l2]
tA and [r1, r2]     tB. That is
10,
VL(tL, tR, n) = F(l2) – F(l1),
VR(tL, tR, n) = F(r2) – F(r1).
First, we analyze the case when the electorate is symmetrically
distributed: m
pJ(t) = - 
2
1
 (t - tJ)2. 
' 
' 
= 
2
1
. 
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Figure 4
Display of Typical Equilibria for Different Distributions of the Electorate
Figure 4(a) depicts the political equilibrium. The following implica-
tions are worth emphasizing (we will prove in Section 5 that they are not
particular to the present example, but characteristic of a symmetrically distrib-
uted electorate):
(i) parties announce differentiated, non-extreme, symmetric
platforms:
(ii) the equilibrium policy coincides with the mean and the median:
(iii) each party receives 50% of the vote cast;
(iv) a substantial fraction of the population prefers voting to
abstaining: turnout » 37 %; and
(v) abstention occurs for voters with extreme views as well as with
moderate views.
*
Lt = .25 and 
*
Rt = .75; 
*
Rt  = .5; 
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Observe that the symmetric features of the equilibrium are a
consequence of  the  symmetry  imposed  on  the electorate,  since parties are
not symmetric: tL= .3 and tR= .8.
How important is the symmetry assumption in the previous case? In
a second exercise we consider a right skewed electorate: m = 0.7. The
equilibrium is presented in Figure 4(b). Not surprisingly, symmetry vanishes.
However, and more interestingly, the substance of the equilibrium does not
change: parties announce differentiated platforms, abstention occurs for ex-
treme and moderate voters, and there is a substantial turnout (40.5%). Unlike
in the symmetric case, the equilibrium policy differs from the median        =0.58
<0.61 = median). Finally, one party wins (party R receives 55% of the vote).
This is an important finding since most models of political competition, even
those with uncertainty built in, unrealistically predict that each party always
obtains (or expects to obtain) fifty percent of the vote.
In this section, we have worked out an example that anticipates the
most relevant results of the paper. Section 5 presents the formal analysis of the
existence and characterization of equilibria. First, however, we find interest-
ing to consider the particular case where voting is purely pragmatic.
4. PURELY PRAGMATIC VOTING
By abstracting from non-pragmatic voting we are able to recreate the
standard political competition model with perfect information, except that
here the implemented policy function substitutes a winner-takes-all
assumption. Therefore, this particular case isolates the impact that
incorporating political compromise has in the study of electoral politics.
( *t
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A standard result in the political competition literature is that, in an
environment of perfect information, the parties’ platforms converge (Roemer,
1996). Moreover, no citizen has an incentive to vote: because both parties
announce identical platforms, the probability of being pivotal is zero for all
citizens.
We obtain completely opposite results when political compromise
replaces the winner-takes-all postulate: parties propose extreme platforms
and "everybody" prefers active voting to abstaining11. Moreover, it is notable
that, without additional assumptions beyond single-peakedness, an
equilibrium always exists and is unique for any distribution of the electorate.
This is an important finding in a field where existence of equilibrium is a
permanent struggle (Roemer, 1997).
For the rest of this section we assume that voting behavior is fully
driven by its pragmatic component.
Assumption 2 (A2) h(t;t) = 0 for all t Î T and for all agent t.
Observe that A2 is equivalent to
Lemma 4.1   Let A1 and A2 hold. Then:
Proof: All the proofs are presented in the Appendix.                           ¨
v(s; tL, tR, n; t) = wt(s; tL, tR, n). 
(i) Given tL, tR Î T and n Î [0,1], everybody votes.  
Moreover, for tL < TR, everybody to the left of  tˆ  (tL,tR,n) votes 
for L while everybody to the right of   tˆ   (tL,tR,n) votes for R. 
That is, VL(tL,tR,n) = [t, tˆ  (tL,tR,n)), and VR(tL,tR,n) = ( tˆ  (tL,tR,n), t ].
(ii) c(tL, tR) is non-empty and single-valued for all (tL, tR)ÎT
2. 
(iii) c is continuous, except may be at tL = tR. 
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Because c is a function, we are able to formulate the implemented
policy  and  the  parties’  utilities  in  their  reduced  form. Let                          be
defined by
And, for J = L, R, let                               be defined by
Lemma 4.2  The functions       and          are continuous on T2.
We follow the standard procedure to prove the existence of a Nash
equilibrium: first, we construct the best-response correspondences, then we
look for a fixed point.
The best-response correspondence of party J = L, R assigns to each
alternative the set of utility maximizers. That is,
Before the formal statement of the existence theorem, Lemma 4.3
shows that if a party cannot ensure the implementation of its ideal policy,
then  its  best  choice  is  to  propose  an  extreme  platform,  namely,  t  for  L  or
     for R.
Lemma 4.3  Let A1 and A2 hold.
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
t~ : T2 à T
( ) ( )( )RLRLRL t,t,t,ttˆt,tt~ c= . (4.1) 
J
~p : T à T
( ) ( )( )RLJRLJ t,tt~t,t~ p=p . (4.2) 
 
J
~pt
~
 
( ) ( ){ }Tt:t,t~maxargtBR RLRL Îp=  
( ) ( ){ }Tt:t,t~maxargtBR LRLR Îp=  
t   
The best-response correspondence of party J, BRJ, is single- 
valued and continuous (thus it can be viewed as a continuous 
function), J = L,R. 
Given tR ³ tL, if there exists a 
0
Lt  such that ( ) LR0L t,tt~ t= , 
then ( ) { }0LRL ttBR = ; otherwise, ( ) { }ttBR RL = . 
Given tL £ tL, if there exists a 
0
Rt  such that ( ) R0RL t,tt~ t= , 
 then ( ) { }0RLR ttBR = ; otherwise, ( ) { }ttBR LR = . 
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Theorem 4.1  Let A1 and A2 hold. Then:
   (i)
   (ii)
This section has recreated the standard political competition model
with perfect information, substituting the winner-takes-all assumption for a
political compromise policy-setting process. The main observation is the
disappearance of the convergence tendency of parties’ proposals. We obtain
just the opposite result: the smallest influence of the opposition’s platform in
the determination of the implemented policy provokes a divergence tendency
that takes parties to radicalize their platforms.
In the following section we expand the model to allow for ideological
voting. We obtain that typically parties announce differentiated, but non-
extreme platforms. The key element to understand the intuition is abstention.
By announcing an extreme platforms, a party alienates part of its constituency
(who cares now about the platform.) If this alienation effect is strong enough,
it will drive parties away from radicalizing their platforms.
5. PRAGMATIC AND IDEOLOGICAL VOTING
The main conclusion from the previous section appears in Theorem
4.1: convergence of parties’ platforms, traditionally associated with political
competition, is an artifact created by the winner-takes-all assumption. As soon
as we perturb this assumption a little bit and let the opposition intervene (to
some extent) into policy-setting, a tendency towards divergence appears.
Recall that an almost winner-takes-all implemented policy function (like the
one in Figure 1(a)) would be enough to make parties announce radical
a political equilibrium exists, and  
if (tL*,tR*) are the platforms at equilibrium, 
either (tL*,tR*) = (t, t ) 
or t~ (tL*,tR*) = tJ, for some J=L,R. 
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platforms. One may object that this result is as unrealistic as the standard
Median Voter Theorem, where parties propose exactly the same policy and
everybody votes. However, we claim that the "pathological" behavior found
here is the consequence of an unrealistic feature of the model studied in
Section 4, namely the absence of ideological voting. We will see that under a
more realistic (and more complicated) structure, already presented in Section
2, parties’ and voters’ behavior resemble closer what we observe in reality.
The inclusion of a non-pragmatic component of voting that depends
on the platforms of the parties opens the possibility to abstention. Because
abstention notably complicates the analysis, we sacrifice some generality and
work within a simpler framework. First, we substitute Assumption 1 with the
following assumption:
Assumption 3 (A3)
That is, we take the implemented policy to be equivalent to
proportional representation12.
Second, consider a continuum of voters with Euclidean prefer-
ences over policies represented by the following utility function:
Assumption 4 (A4)
Third, let the ideological component of voting be a non-increasing
and concave function of the distance between the platform of the party and
the "ideology" of the voter:
Assumption 5 (A5)
( ) ( ) RLRL t1t,ttt~ n-+n=n , for all ( )n,tt RL . 
 ( ) ( )2t
2
1;tu t--=t  
h(t:t) = z(|t-t|), with z’< 0 (decreasing), z”< 0 (concave), and 
(concave), and z(0) = 0. 
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Finally, it is convenient for the exposition to adopt the convention
T=[0,1].
We want to emphasize that all specifications have been imposed on
citizen’s preferences and none on parties’ preferences, which are only assumed
to be single-peaked.
A first result (Theorem 5.1) proves what we already observed in the
examples presented in Section 3: the support for each party is an interval
around the platform announced by that party. It will follow (Theorem 5.2)
that there exists one and only one consistent electoral outcome associated to
each pair of platforms.
Theorem 5.1  Let A3, A4, and A5 hold. Given tL, tR, and n, with tL ¹ tR, there exist two
intervals
such that if t votes for L, then tÎIl, and if t votes for R, then tÎIr. Thus
Moreover, VL(tL,tR,n) + VR(tL,tR,n) > 0, VL and VR are continuous, VL is
non-increasing in n, and VR is non-decreasing in n.
Lemma 5.2   Let A3, A4, and A5 hold. The consistent electoral outcome correspondence
c is non-empty, single-valued, and continuous for all tL ¹ tR.
The previous lemma shows that there exists a unique electoral outcome
associated to each pair of differentiated platforms. When both parties propose
identical platforms, the implemented policy is unmistakably the common
Il(tL,tR,n) = [l1(tL,tR,n), l2(tL,tR,n)], and 
Ir(tL,tR,n) = [r1(tL,tR,n), r2(tL,tR,n)] 
VL(tL,tR,n) = m(Il(tL,tR,n)) and 
VR(tL,tR,n) = m(Ir(tL,tR,n)). 
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platform, independent of the electoral outcome. Therefore, we can write the
implemented policy as:
We argued at the end of the previous section that parties proposed
extreme platforms because voters were only concerned about pragmatic voting.
In that context, everybody voted and therefore, parties did not worry about
alienating part of the electorate by becoming too extreme in their platforms. In
order to validate our claim we need to show that when a non-pragmatic
component of voting is present, parties do not take extreme positions (at least
not necessarily). We start by studying a particular case: a symmetrically
distributed electorate13.
The following theorem shows that for the symmetric case an
equilibrium always exists and, not surprisingly, it is symmetric: parties propose
differentiated and symmetric policies, the vote is equally split, and the
implemented policy is the median policy, which, in this case, coincides with
the mean. It is easy to construct examples where platforms are not extreme. We
only need a sufficiently relevant non-pragmatic component of voting and a
fairly concentrated distribution (refer to the example 1 in Section 3).
Theorem 5.1 (Symmetry) Let A3, A4, and A5 hold. Let the electorate be distributed
symmetrically around ½: f(x) = f(1 - x). If tL £ ½ £ tR , tL ¹ tR , then:
(i)
(ii)
 
( ) ( )( )
î
í
ì
==
¹c
=
.tttift
,ttift,t,t,ttˆ
t,tt~
RL
RLRLRL
RL  
there exists a political equilibrium (tL*, tR*,n*), with tL* = ½-k, 
tR* = ½+k, for some k Î [0, ½); 
the implemented policy is t* = ½, and both parties receive the 
same share of votes n* = ½. 
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The results found under symmetry extend to a more generic case
where the electorate is not symmetrically distributed. However, when the
distribution is not symmetric one may construct examples where an
equilibrium fails to exist14: Figure 6 illustrates indeed such an example (details
available from the author). These examples are not easy to find and involve
very strong asymmetries. The example here shows that, in the asymmetric case
with an ideological component of the vote, existence requires some
assumptions beyond the ones discussed so far. Ideally, such assumptions
would be imposed on the primitives of the model (g, F, u, and h). But, because
c is implicitly derived from a complex computation, this would be an arduous
task, and we choose to postulate a condition on c, namely the log-concavity of
c, a premise also known in the literature as decreasing hazard rate15. As Figure
6(b) shows, this condition is violated in our example of non-existence of
equilibrium.
Figure 6
Example of non-existence of equilibrium for very asymmetric distributions.
The density function is bi-triangular and h(t;t) = -5|t-t|
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Theorem 5.2  Let A3, A4, and A5 hold. Let c be log-concave in tL and let 1-c be
log-concave in tR. Then:
(i) a political equilibrium exists,
(ii) at equilibrium parties propose differentiated but not necessarily
extreme policies, and
(iii) the implemented policy is the same in all equilibria.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The well known and widely used median voter theorem (at
equilibrium, both candidates announce the same policy which coincides
with the policy preferred by the median voter) is the standard result in
political competition under perfect information or certainty. This elegant
theoretical proposition is clearly at odds with the empirical evidence. In this
paper we enrich the theoretical framework to allow for non-trivial policy-
setting processes and for sophisticated voters who may abstain. First, we show
that platform convergence is a non-robust feature created by the winner-
takes-all assumption (Section 4). A divergent tendency in platform writing
arises when the policy implemented by the winner party is sensitive to the
electoral margin of victory. And this is true for any positive degree of sensitivity.
Second, we show that, under reasonable assumptions, an equilibrium always
exists (Section 5). At equilibrium, parties announce differentiated but non-
extreme platforms, the implemented policy consistently differs from the ideal
policy of the median voter (thus the median voter ceases to be decisive), voters
concentrate around the announce platforms and abstention occurs among
voters with extreme views as well as with moderate views.
The results provided in our model present a more accurate description
of political competition. Consider, for example, two countries identical in
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everything but on the distribution of their electorate. While country A’s
electorate follows a concentrated-in-the-middle, unimodal distribution, the
electorate of country B is fractured into two radical groups (its density function
presents two peaks with the majority of the population located around them).
According to our model, parties in country A would move towards the center
to avoid the alienation of the core of their constituency, while parties in
country B will radicalize their positions16. Suppose that the median voter is
the same in both countries: a moderate citizen. Our conclusions would not
change. However, those models based on the median voter would be
insensitive to the radicalization of the electorate in country B: not only the
implemented policy would be the same moderate policy in country A and
country B, but also parties would take moderate positions in both countries.
Thus, according to our findings, parties move towards the center of
the political spectrum because (i) the mass of the electorate is concentrated
around moderate views, and (ii) a party alienates the core of its constituency
by radicalizing its platforms. This is in contrast with the standard claim
-originated in Downs’ (1957) seminal book- that parties tend to the middle
because they compete for the vote of the median voter, even when the electorate
is concentrated in radical positions.
The description of the political process can be enriched by extending
some of its stylizations. Perhaps the most interesting extension would be to
make the level of compromise endogenously determined by letting parties
announce not only the platform they stand for, but also how much they will
compromise if they win the election. An analysis of these possibilities is left for
future research.
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1. The recent U.S. presidential election is the latest evidence. Several newspapers
have pointed out that the narrow victory of Bush over Gore will have the
moderation of his political and economic positions as the most likely consequence.
2. Poole and Rosenthal (1984b) use thermometer scores to measure the perceived
location of candidates and policies; Fiorina (1974), Poole and Rosenthal (1984a),
Poole and Daniels (1985) use interest groups ratings; Poole and Rosenthal (1991,
1997), Snyder (1996), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) discover the same pattern
using roll call votes in congress.
3. The implemented policy function described here is equivalent to the legislative
outcome function in Austen-Smith (1989), the implemented policy function in
Ortuño-Ortín (1997), and the outcome function F in Gerber and Ortuño-Ortín
(1998).
4. Since F is a distribution function, there exists a unique probability measure m
such that m ([a,b]) = F(b) - F(a) for all a, b (see Durrett [1996], Corollary 1.3, p.
6).
5. Recall that policies are determined not only by the platforms announced but
also by the relative support that each party receives.
6. Because, unlike under the winner-takes-all assumption, the implemented
policy will generally differ from the platforms, it is natural to differentiate
between voting preferences and the utility from implemented policies. Perhaps
a similar distinction should be incorporated in winner-takes-all models when
uncertainty is present. In those cases, the expected policy consistently differs
from the platform of the winning party.
7. The use of the derivative comes from the assumption that there exists a
continuum of citizens. However, our results do not depend on that assumption.
We could consider instead a sufficiently large number of citizens whose
distribution is represented by a density function. In that case, votes would have
a positive, but tiny effect on the implemented policy, and the pragmatic
component of voting would be defined by the change in the utility of the voter
implied by the effect of his action on the implemented policy. The use of the
continuum simplifies the presentation and is standard in the literature of mass
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elections. Likewise, we could replace n, the fraction of active voters who vote
for L, by the fraction of citizens who vote for L without affecting the results.
8. The pragmatic component of voting is similar to what Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995) define as voting with conditional sincerity. They say that a voter votes with
conditional sincerity if he prefers an increase in the expected vote for the party
he votes for.
9. Note that a party’s preferences do not need to coincide with those of a particular
voter, even if they share the same ideal point.
10. Of course, l1, l2, r1, and r2 are functions of tL, tR, and n. In particular, for tL < tR,
11. To be precise, those voters with ideal policy equal to the implemented policy
are indifferent between voting and abstaining. But everybody else (a subset
of the electorate of measure one) prefers voting to abstaining.
12. Ortuño-Ortín (1997) and Gerber and Ortuño-Ortín (1998) restrict themselves
to this type of weight function.
13. One may argue that symmetry facilitates that both parties locate at the
extremes. Therefore, finding non-extreme platforms for symmetrically
distributed populations strongly supports our claim.
14. In a previous paper (Llavador 2000), we showed that an equilibrium may fail
to exist also in the classic winner-takes-all model when abstention is included
and the distribution has several peaks.
15. In a similar context, Roemer (1997, p. 492) also requires the log-concavity of a
compound function.
16. The implemented policy in country B may or may not be radical, depending
on the relative weight of each group and on the “conciliatory” spirit of the
winning party (the function g in the model).
l 2  =  a  tˆ +  ( 1  -  a ) tL ;  l 1  =  m a x  { b tˆ +  ( 1  -b ) tL  , 0 } ; 
r 1  =  a  tˆ +  ( 1  -  a ) tR ; r 2 =  m i n  { b tˆ +  ( 1  -b ) tR  , 1 } ;  
whe re ,  
2)tt())t,t(('g
)tt())t,t(('g
LRRL
LRRL
+-c
-c
-=a ,  
2)tt())t,t(('g
)tt())t,t(('g
LRRL
LRRL
--c
-c
=b , 
a n d  tˆ = g  ( n ) tL  + (1 -g(n )) t R .  
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